New Jersey is an Equitable Distribution State. This means that marital assets will be divided in a manner that is considered fair but not necessarily equal for the parties. Below we have developed an outline to give a general overview on Equitable Distribution in New Jersey.
Equitable Distribution in New Jersey an Outline Overview.
- Assets subject to Equitable Distribution
- Assets that are Acquired During the Marriage
- Assets acquired in contemplation of marriage
- Assets Immune by Statute
- Premarital – except an increase in active assets value due to efforts of non-owner.
- Gifts from third parties
- Specific Assets: Subject to Equitable Distribution
- Pensions and other retirement accounts that were acquired during the marriage.
- Real Estate as per I(a), (b).
- Automobiles, jewelry, inter-spousal gifts, house contents
- Stocks, bonds, etc.
- Insurance annuities and cash surrender value of life insurance policy
- Business and partnership interests
- Personal injury awards (medical expenses and lost wages only)
- Debts, obligations, tax liabilities
- Assets not subject to Equitable Distribution
- Educational and professional degrees
- Assets immune by statute
- N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23.1: Determination of Equitable Distribution
- Marriage length.
- Age, the physical and emotional health of the parties.
- Income or property brought to the marriage by each party.
- Standard of living during the marriage.
- Existence of written agreements made by the parties
- Income and earning capacity of each party
- The contribution by each party to the education, training or earning power of the other.
- The contribution of each party to the acquisition, dissipation, preservation, depreciation or appreciation in the amount or value of the marital property
- The contribution of the party as a homemaker.
- Tax consequences of the proposed distribution to each party.
- The present value of the property.
- The need of a parent who has physical custody of a child to own or occupy the marital home.
- The debts and liabilities of the parties.
- The need for creation now, or in the future, of a trust fund to secure reasonably foreseeable medical or educational costs for a spouse or child.
- Other factors which the court may deem relevant.
For more information about equitable distribution matters in New Jersey please contact our office at (201) 880-5563, for an appointment with one of our attorneys.
Disclaimer: The contents of this website are of general nature and not intended to be a substitute for legal advice or the formation of a lawyer-client relationship. In order to be properly represented, please contact your local professional. In addition, the information given on this web site has been composed by a New Jersey attorney practicing exclusively in New Jersey. None of the information contained herein should be deemed to apply in other states, nor should this website be construed as an attempt by the author to practice law in any state other than New Jersey.
Harassment and Domestic Violence in New Jersey
Harassment can constitute a basis for the issuance of a restraining order if the statutory elements are satisfied. See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. The statute defines harassment:
Except as provided in subsection e., a person commits a petty disorderly person offense if, with the purpose to harass another, he: a. Makes, or causes to be made, a communication or communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; b. Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or c. Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. [N.J.S.A. 2c:33-4 (emphasis added).]
As provided by the statute, a finding of harassment requires proof of an intent or purpose to harass. State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 576-77 (1997). An assertion by a plaintiff that he or she felt harassed is a subjective belief and insufficient to prove a purpose or intent to harass. See J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 484 (2011). The courts must find that “relief is necessary to prevent further abuse,” before making a finding of harassment. J.D., supra, 207 N.J. at 476 (first quoting Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 250 (App. Div. 1995); and quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)).
Trial courts must determine whether an act is simply an ordinary domestic dispute or disagreement or whether the act crosses the line into domestic violence. Id. at 475. The family court must then determine whether the plaintiff needs the protection of a restraining order. Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 126 (App. Div. 2006) and whether a restraining order is necessary . . . to protect the victim from an immediate danger or prevent further abuse.” Id. at 127. ” The court cannot grant a FRO by just merely concluding that plaintiff has described acts that qualify as harassment and omitting whether the plaintiffs need the protection of the restraining order as it would ‘trivialize the plight of true victims,’ in the process.” J.D., supra, 207 N.J. at 476 (internal citations omitted)(quoting Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 250 (App. Div. 1995)).
In New Jersey, in order for the family court to grant a FRO in a domestic violence matter involving harassment, the courts must not only decide that the predicate offense of harassment happened but it needs also to determine whether the plaintiff needs the protection of a final restraining order.
For more information about domestic violence matters in New Jersey please contact our office at (201) 880-5563, for an appointment with one of our attorneys.
The doctrine of economic duress has significantly developed and expanded, in recognition of the ever-increasing complexity of the business world. Claims of economic duress in business litigation are becoming more frequent. Several courts, including the United States Supreme Court, have acknowledged that there are situations under which financial pressure may cancel an otherwise enforceable contract. See 13 S. Williston, Contracts, § 1603 at 664 (3d ed. 1970); United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 62 S.Ct. 581, 86 L.Ed. 855 (1942); Hartsville Oil Mill v. United States, 271 U.S. 43, 46 S.Ct. 389, 70 L.Ed. 822 (1926).The definition of economic duress is set forth in Williston:1. The party alleging economic duress must show that he has been the victim of a wrongful or unlawful act or threat, and2. Such act or threat must be one which deprives the victim of his unfettered will. [13 Williston, supra, § 1617 at 704 (footnotes omitted)]
The courts in New Jersey have defined economic duress as in the Williston formulation. In Woodside Homes, Inc. v. Morristown, 26 N.J. 529, 544 (1958), define that economic duress requires “an assent by one party to an improper or wrongful demand by another under circumstances in which the former has little choice but to accede to the demand. Economic duress occurs when the party alleging it is the victim of a wrongful or unlawful act or threat which deprives the victim of his unfettered will. Quigley v. KPMG Peat Marwick, LLP, 330 N.J.Super. 252, 263 (App. Div. 2000) (citing 13 Williston on Contracts § 1617), certify. denied, 165 N.J. 527 (2000).
It is important to distinguish that “Merely taking advantage of another’s financial difficulty is not duress. Rather, the person alleging financial difficulty must allege that it was contributed to or caused by the one accused of coercion.” Continental Bank v. Barclay Riding Academy, Inc., 93 N.J. 153, 176, 459 A.2d 1163, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 994, 104 S.Ct. 488, 78 L.Ed.2d 684 (1983). Therefore, when there is adequacy of consideration, there is generally no duress…. Whenever a party to a contract seeks the best possible terms, there can be no rescission merely upon the grounds of driving a hard bargain. Merely taking advantage of another’s financial difficulty is not duress. Rather, the person alleging financial difficulty must allege that it was contributed to or caused by the one accused of coercion…. Under this rule, the party exerting pressure is scored only for that for which he alone is responsible. [Williston, supra, § 1617 at 708 (footnotes omitted)]
Disclaimer: The contents of this website are of general nature and not intended to be a substitute for legal advice or the formation of a lawyer-client relationship. In order to be properly represented, please contact your local professional. In addition, the information given on this website has been composed by a New Jersey attorney practicing exclusively in New Jersey. None of the information contained herein should be deemed to apply in other states, nor should this website be construed as an attempt by the author to practice law in any state other than New Jersey.